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In this article, we discuss the optimality of basis transformations as a security measure for quantum
key distribution protocols based on entanglement swapping. To estimate the security, we focus on
the information an adversary obtains on the raw key bits from a generic version of a collective attack
strategy. In the scenario described in this article, the application of general basis transformations
serving as a counter measure by one or both legitimate parties is analyzed. In this context, we
show that the angles, which describe these basis transformations can be optimized compared to the
application of a Hadamard operation, which is the standard basis transformation recurrently found in
literature. As a main result, we show that the adversary’s information can be reduced to an amount
of IAE ≃ 0.20752 when using a single basis transformation and to an amount of IAE ≃ 0.0548 when
combining two different basis transformations. This is less than half the information compared to
other protocols using a Hadamard operation and thus represents an advantage regarding the security
of entanglement swapping based protocols.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) is an important ap-
plication of quantum mechanics and QKD protocols have
been studied at length in theory and in practical im-
plementations [1–8]. Most of these protocols focus on
prepare and measure schemes, where single qubits are
in transit between the communication parties Alice and
Bob. The security of these protocols has been discussed
in depth and security proofs have been given for exam-
ple in [9–11]. In addition to these prepare and measure
protocols several protocols based on the phenomenon of
entanglement swapping have been introduced [12–16]. In
these protocols, entanglement swapping is used to obtain
correlated measurement results between the legitimate
communication parties, Alice and Bob. In other words,
each party performs a Bell state measurement and due
to entanglement swapping their results are correlated and
further on used to establish a secret key.
Entanglement swapping has been introduced by Ben-
nett et al. [17], Zukowski et al. [18] as well as Yurke and
Stolen [19], respectively. It provides the unique possi-
bility to generate entanglement from particles that never
interacted in the past. In detail, Alice and Bob share two
Bell states of the form |Φ+〉12 and |Φ+〉34 such that af-
terwards Alice is in possession of qubits 1 and 3 and Bob
of qubits 2 and 4 (cf. Figure 1). Then Alice performs
a complete Bell state measurement on the two qubits in
her possession, which results in
|Φ+〉12 ⊗ |Φ+〉34 = 1
2
(
|Φ+〉|Φ+〉+ |Φ−〉|Φ−〉
+|Ψ+〉|Ψ+〉+ |Ψ−〉|Ψ−〉
)
1324
(1)
After the measurement, the qubits 2 and 4 at Bob’s side
collapse into a Bell state although they originated at com-
pletely different sources. Moreover, the state of Bob’s
qubits depends on Alice’s measurement result. As pre-
sented in eq. (1), Bob always obtains the same result as
Alice when performing a Bell state measurement on his
qubits.
The security of QKD protocols based on entanglement
swapping has been discussed on the surface so far. It has
only been shown that these protocols are secure against
intercept-resend attacks and basic collective attacks (cf.
for example [12, 13, 15]). Therefore, we analyze a general
version of a collective attack where the adversary tries to
simulate the correlations between Alice and Bob [20]. A
basic technique to secure a QKD protocol is to use a
basis transformation, usually a Hadamard operation, to
make it easier to detect an adversary as implemented, for
example, in the prepare and measure schemes described
in [1] and [3]. Hence, we analyze the security with respect
to a general basis transformation defined by the angles
θA and φA applied by Alice and a transformation defined
by the angles θB and φB applied by Bob. In the course
of that, we are going to identify which values for θA, φA,
θB and φB are optimal such that an adversary has only
a minimum amount of information on the secret raw key.
In the following section, we give a short review of
the simulation attack, a generic collective attack strategy
where an adversary applies a six-qubit state to eavesdrop
Bob’s measurement result. A detailed discussion of this
attack strategy can be found in [20]. Further, we look at
the general definition of basis transformations and their
effect onto Bell states and entanglement swapping. Us-
ing the definitions of general basis transformations, we
discuss in the next sections the effects on the security of
entanglement swapping based QKD protocols regarding
two scenarios: we distinguish between the application of
a basis transformation by only one communication party
and the combined application of two different basis trans-
formations by each of the communication parties. Addi-
tionally, we analyze for each of these scenarios the appli-
cation of a simple transformation with only one degree
of freedom and a general transformation. In the end, we
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FIG. 1: Sketch of a standard setup for an entanglement swap-
ping based QKD protocol using a basis transformation Tx.
sum up the implications of the results on the security of
entanglement based QKD protocols.
THE SIMULATION ATTACK STRATEGY
In entanglement swapping based QKD protocols like
[12–16] Alice and Bob rest their security check onto the
correlations between their respective measurement re-
sults coming from the entanglement swapping (cf. eq.
(1)). If these correlations are violated to a certain
amount, Alice and Bob have to assume that an eaves-
dropper is present. Hence, a general version of a collec-
tive attack has the following basic idea: the adversary
Eve tries to find a multi-qubit state, which preserves the
correlation between the two legitimate parties. Further,
she introduces additional qubits to distinguish between
Alice’s and Bob’s respective measurement results. If she
is able to find such a state, Eve stays undetected during
her intervention and is able to obtain a certain amount
of information about the key. In a previous article [20],
we already described such a collective attack called sim-
ulation attack for a specific protocol [16]. The general-
ization is straight forward as described in the following
paragraphs.
It has been pointed out in detail in [20] that Eve uses
four qubits to simulate the correlations between Alice
and Bob and she further introduces additional systems,
i.e. |ϕi〉, to distinguish between Alice’s different mea-
surement results. This leads to the state
|δ〉 = 1
2
(
|Φ+〉|Φ+〉|ϕ1〉+ |Φ−〉|Φ−〉|ϕ2〉
|Ψ+〉|Ψ+〉|ϕ3〉+ |Ψ−〉|Ψ−〉|ϕ4〉
)
PRQSTU
(2)
which is a more general version than described in
[20]. This state preserves the correlation of Alice’s and
Bob’s measurement results coming from the entangle-
ment swapping (cf. eq. (1)): from eq. (2) it is easy
to see that Alice obtains one of the four Bell states when
performing a Bell state measurement on qubits P and
R. This measurement leaves Bob’s qubits Q and S in a
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FIG. 2: Illustration of the simulation attack on a standard
setup for an entanglement swapping based QKD protocol us-
ing a basis transformation Tx.
Bell state fully correlated to Alice’s result. Accordingly,
Eve’s qubits T and U are in one of the auxiliary states
|ϕi〉 she prepared.
Eve has to choose the auxiliary systems |ϕi〉 such that
〈ϕi|ϕj〉 = 0 i, j ∈ {1, ..., 4} i 6= j (3)
which allows her to perfectly distinguish between Alice’s
and Bob’s respective measurement results. Thus, she is
able to eavesdrop Alice’s and Bob’s measurement results
and obtains full information about the classical raw key
generated out of them.
There are different ways for Eve to distribute the state
|δ〉P−U between Alice and Bob. One possibility is that
Eve is in possession of Alice’s and Bob’s source and gen-
erates |δ〉P−U instead of Bell states. This is a rather
strong assumption, because the sources are usually lo-
cated at Alice’s or Bob’s laboratory, which should be a
secure environment. Eve’s second possibility is to inter-
cept the qubits 2 and 3 flying from Alice to Bob and vice
versa and to use entanglement swapping to distribute the
state |δ〉. This is a straight forward method as already
described in [20].
In detail, Eve distributes qubits P , Q, R and S between
Alice and Bob using entanglement swapping such that
Alice is in possession of qubits 1 and R and Bob is in
possession of qubits Q and 4 (cf. (1) in Figure 2). When
Alice performs a Bell state measurement on qubits 1 and
R the state of qubits Q and 4 collapses into the same
Bell state, which Alice obtained from her measurement
(cf. eq. (2) and picture (4) in Figure 2). In particular, if
Alice obtains |Φ+〉1R the state of the remaining qubits is
|Φ+〉Q4|ϕ1〉TU (4)
and similarly for Alice’s other results |Φ−〉 and |Ψ±〉.
This is the exact correlation Alice and Bob would expect
from entanglement swapping if no adversary is present
(cf. eq. (1) from above). Hence, Eve stays undetected
when Alice and Bob compare some of their results in
3public to check for eavesdroppers. The auxiliary system
|ϕi〉 remains at Eve’s side and its state is completely de-
termined by Alice’s measurement result. Therefore, Eve
has full information on Alice’s and Bob’s measurement
results and is able to perfectly eavesdrop the classical
raw key.
We want to stress that the state |δ〉 is generic for all
protocols where 2 qubits are exchanged between Alice
and Bob during one round of key generation as, for ex-
ample, the QKD protocols presented by Song [15], Li et
al. [16] or Cabello [12]. As already pointed out in [20],
the state |δ〉 can also be used for different initial Bell
states. For protocols with a higher number of qubits the
state |δ〉 has to be extended accordingly.
BASIS TRANSFORMATIONS
In QKD, the most common way to detect the pres-
ence of an adversary is to use a random application of
a basis transformation by one of the legitimate commu-
nication parties. This method can be found in prepare
an measure protocols (e.g. in [1] or [3]) as well as en-
tanglement swapping based protocols (e.g. in [13, 15] or
the improved version of the protocol in [16]). The idea is
to randomly alter the initial state to make it impossible
for an adversary to eavesdrop the information transmit-
ted without introducing a certain error rate, i.e. without
being detected. The operation most commonly used in
these protocols is the Hadamard operation described by
the matrix
1√
2
(
1 1
1 −1
)
(5)
which is a transformation from the Z- into the X-basis.
For our further discussion, the X-basis is given by the
states |x+〉 and |x−〉 with
|x±〉 = 1√
2
(
|0〉 ± |1〉
)
(6)
and the Z-basis is the computational basis consisting of
the states |0〉 and |1〉. The effect of the Hadamard oper-
ation is simply described as
|0〉 7−→ |x+〉 |1〉 7−→ |x−〉. (7)
In general, a transformation Tx from the Z basis into the
X-basis can be described as a rotation about the X-axis
by some angle θ combined with two rotations about the
Z-axis by some angle φ, i.e.
Tx
(
θ, φ
)
= eiφRz
(
φ
)
Rx
(
θ
)
Rz
(
φ
)
. (8)
The rotations about the X- or Z-axis are described in
the most general way by the operators (cf. for example
[21] for further details on rotation operators)
Rx
(
θ
)
=
(
cos θ2 −i sin θ2
−i sin θ2 cos θ2
)
Rz
(
θ
)
=
(
e−iθ/2 0
0 eiθ/2
)
.
(9)
For the sake of completeness we want to add that a rota-
tion about the Y -axis is similarly defined by the operator
Ry
(
θ
)
=
(
cos θ2 − sin θ2
sin θ2 cos
θ
2
)
(10)
but will not be used in the context of this article. Based
on these operators, we directly obtain the matrix repre-
sentation for Tx(θ, φ) as
Tx
(
θ, φ
)
=
(
cos θ2 −i eiφ sin θ2
−i eiφ sin θ2 e2iφ cos θ2
)
(11)
and the effect of Tx(θ, φ) on the computational basis
Tx
(
θ, φ
)|0〉 = cos θ
2
|0〉 − i eiφ sin θ
2
|1〉
Tx
(
θ, φ
)|1〉 = −i eiφ sin θ
2
|0〉+ e2iφ cos θ
2
|1〉.
(12)
From these two equations above we immediately see that
the Hadamard operation is just the special case where
θ = φ = pi/2.
In QKD protocols based on entanglement swapping the
basis transformation is usually applied onto one qubit of
a Bell state. Taking the general transformation Tx(θ, φ)
from eq. (11) into account, the Bell state |Φ+〉 changes
into
T (1)x
(
θ, φ
)|Φ+〉12 =cos θ
2
1√
2
(
|00〉+ e2iφ|11〉
)
−i eiφ sin θ
2
1√
2
(
|01〉+ |10〉
) (13)
and accordingly for the other Bell states. The super-
script ”(1)” in eq. (13) indicates that the transformation
Tx
(
θ, φ
)
is applied on qubit 1. As a consequence, the ap-
plication of Tx(θ, φ) before the entanglement swapping is
performed changes the results based on the angles θ and
φ. In detail, we have the state
T (1)x
(
θ, φ
)|Φ+〉12|Φ+〉34 =
1
2
(
|Φ+〉13T (2)x
(
θ, φ
)|Φ+〉24
+|Φ−〉13T (2)x
(
θ, φ
)|Φ−〉24
+|Ψ+〉13T (2)x
(
θ, φ
)|Ψ+〉24
+|Ψ−〉13T (2)x
(
θ, φ
)|Ψ−〉24
)
(14)
upon which Alice performs her Bell state measurement
on qubits 1 and 3 (cf. Figure 1). Here, the superscripts
4”(1)” and ”(2)” in eq. (14) indicate that after Alice’s
Bell state measurement on qubits 1 and 3 the transfor-
mation Tx
(
θ, φ
)
swaps from qubit 1 onto qubit 2. When
Bob performs his Bell state measurement on qubits 2 and
4, he obtains a result correlated to Alice’s measurement
outcome only with probability (cf. eq. (13) and eq. (14)
above)
Pcorr = cos
2 θ
2
cos2(φ). (15)
Otherwise, he obtains an uncorrelated result, which dif-
fers from Alice’s result by a Pauli operation, i.e. σz or
σx. That becomes a problem because Bob is no longer
able to compute Alice’s state based on his result and vice
versa.
Fortunately, Bob can resolve this problem by trans-
forming the state back into its original form. Following
eq. (14), where Alice performs Tx
(
θ, φ
)
on qubit 1, he
achieves that by applying the inverse T−1x
(
θ, φ
)
on qubit
2 of his state. As we will see in the following section, if an
adversary interferes with the communication, the effects
of Alice’s basis transformation can not be represented as
in eq. (14) any longer. Thus, even if Bob applies the
inverse transformation, Alice’s and Bob’s results are un-
correlated to a certain amount. This amount is reflected
in an error rate detected by Alice and Bob during post
processing.
APPLICATION OF SIMPLE BASIS
TRANSFORMATIONS
In this section we want to give a short review on the re-
sults in [22, 23] dealing with the scenarios where Alice or
Bob or both parties randomly apply a simplified version
of the basis transformation described above. The simpli-
fication addresses the angle φ, i.e. the rotation about the
Z-axis. In the security discussions in [22], the angle φ is
fixed at pi/2 for reasons of simplicity. That means, the
rotation about the Z-axis is constant at an angle of pi/2
such that only the angle θ can be chosen freely. As al-
ready pointed out above, the Hadamard operation equals
Tx(pi/2, pi/2) (cf. eq. (8)). Hence, the focus of this sec-
tion is to analyze, whether the Hadamard operation is
optimal when applied by one party and by both parties,
respectively. To distinguish between the basis transfor-
mations applied by Alice and Bob, we discuss a setup
where a basis transformation about an angle θA is ap-
plied by Alice and a transformation about an angle θB is
applied by Bob, respectively (cf. Figure 1).
Application of a Single Transformation
From the structure of |δ〉1QR4TU given in eq. (2) we see
that Eve is able to obtain full information about Alice’s
and Bob’s secret whenever Alice and Bob do not apply
any basis transformation, i.e. they use the state |δ〉 Eve
introduced into the protocol. For the first scenario, where
only Alice randomly applies the basis transformation, the
overall state of the system after Eve’s distribution of the
state |δ〉P−U can simply be described as
|δ′〉 = T (1)x (θA, pi2 )|δ〉1QR4TU (16)
where the superscript ”(1)” again indicates that
Tx(θA, pi/2) is applied on qubit 1. When Eve sends qubits
R and Q to Alice and Bob, respectively, the state after
Alice’s Bell state measurement on qubits 1 and R is
cos
θA
2
|Φ−〉Q4|ϕ2〉TU + sin θA
2
|Ψ+〉Q4|ϕ3〉TU (17)
assuming Alice obtained |Φ+〉1R (for Alice’s other three
possible results the state changes accordingly). Compar-
ing this with eq. (13) and eq. (14) it indicates that in
this case Bob’s transformation back into the Z-basis does
not re-establish the correlations between Alice and Bob
properly. Performing the calculations we see that Bob’s
operation Tx(θA, pi/2) brings qubits Q, 4, T and U into
the form
|Φ+〉Q4
[
cos2
θA
2
|ϕ2〉TU + sin2 θA
2
|ϕ3〉TU
]
−|Ψ−〉Q4
[
sin θA
2
|ϕ2〉TU − sin θA
2
|ϕ3〉TU
]
.
(18)
When Bob performs a Bell state measurement, we can
directly see from this expression that Bob obtains either
the correlated result |Φ+〉Q4 with probability
Pcorr =
(
cos2
θA
2
)2
+
(
sin2
θA
2
)2
=
3 + cos(2θA)
4
(19)
or an error, i.e. the state |Ψ−〉Q4, otherwise. In detail,
Eve introduces an error with probability (sin2 θA)/2 and
since Alice applies the basis transformation at random,
i.e. with probability 1/2, this yields an expected error
probability
〈Pe〉 = 1
4
sin2 θA. (20)
It is of major interest for the adversary Eve that Bob ob-
tains a correlated result with a high probability such that
her interference stays undetected. Nevertheless, based on
the results in eq. (18) we see that it is not possible for Eve
to perform an operation on T and U such that Bob will
obtain a correlated result with higher probability than
given in eq. (19). This is due to the fact that Eve has
to choose the states |ϕi〉 in a way that she is able to per-
fectly distinguish between them. Therefore, they have to
be orthogonal, as already pointed out in eq. (3) above.
5Besides staying undetected, Eve’s second interest is to
obtain as much information on the classical raw key bits
as possible. The probability that Eve obtains the same
classical bit from her measurement as Alice and Bob ob-
tain from their Bell state measurements is called the col-
lision probability Pc. As already pointed out above, if
Alice and Bob do not apply a basis transformation, Eve
always has full information about Alice’s and Bob’s mea-
surement outcomes, i.e. their classical raw key bits (cf.
eq. (2) above). In the current scenario with one basis
transformation Tx(θA, pi/2), Eve obtains the state |ϕ2〉TU
from her Bell state measurement on qubits T and U with
probability
Pc =
cos2 θ2
3+cos (2θA)
4
=
(1 + cos(θA))
2
3 + cos (2θA)
(21)
as long as Alice’s and Bob’s results are correlated. This
probability comes directly from eq. (18) and eq. (19)
above and in that case Eve knows that Bob obtained
|Φ+〉Q4 and further on the respective raw key bits. Sum-
ming over all possible measurement outcomes for Alice,
Bob and Eve in all possible scenarios (i.e. application of
Tx(θA, pi/2) and no basis transformation at all) the ex-
pected collision probability for the whole protocol can be
computed and results in
〈Pc〉 = 1
8
(
7 + cos 2θA
)
. (22)
This directly leads to the Shannon entropy
H =
1
2
h
(
cos2
θA
2
)
(23)
where h(x) = −x log2 x− (1−x) log2(1−x) is the binary
entropy.
Looking at the plot of 〈Pe〉 and H in Figure 3, we see
that the optimal angle θA for a single basis transforma-
tion is pi/2, i.e. the Hadamard operation. Hence, for
protocols using only one basis transformation, the appli-
cation of the Hadamard operation is optimal, as it is al-
ready known from literature [13, 20, 22]. In this case the
average error probability as well as the Shannon entropy
are maximal at 〈Pe〉 = 0.25 and H = 0.5 (cf. Figure
3). If only Bob applies the basis transformation the cal-
culations run analogous and therefore provide the same
results. Further, Eve’s information on the bits of the
secret key is given by the mutual information
IAE = 1−H = 1− 1
2
=
1
2
(24)
which means that Eve has 0.5 bits of information on ev-
ery bit of the secret key. Using post processing methods,
i.e. error correction and privacy amplification, Eve’s in-
formation can be brought below 1 bit of the whole secret
key as long as the error rate is below ∼ 11% [11]. This is
more or less the standard threshold value for the prepare
and measure QKD protocols.
H
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FIG. 3: Alice’s and Bob’s Shannon entropy H and the ac-
cording average error probability 〈Pe〉 if either Alice or Bob
randomly applies a basis transformation.
Application of Combined Transformations
In the previous paragraphs, we discussed the applica-
tion of a basis transformation at either Alice’s or Bob’s
side. When both parties apply a basis transformation
with a different angle, i.e. Tx(θA, pi/2) and Tx(θB , pi/2),
then the overall state changes to
|δ′〉 = T (1)x (θA, pi2 ) T (4)x (θB, pi2 ) |δ〉1QR4TU . (25)
After Alice’s Bell state measurement on qubits 1 and R
and Bob’s application of Tx(θB, pi/2) on qubit Q the state
of the remaining qubits is
|Φ+〉Q4
[
cos2
θA − θB
2
|ϕ1〉TU
+sin2
θA − θB
2
|ϕ4〉TU
]
−|Ψ−〉Q4
[
sin2
θA − θB
2
|ϕ1〉TU
− sin2 θA − θB
2
|ϕ4〉TU
]
(26)
Also in this case Eve measures either |ϕ1〉 or |ϕ4〉 and
has no opportunity to perform an operation such that
Bob obtains a result correlated to Alice’s outcome. Con-
sequently, Bob observes a correlated result with a prob-
ability similar to eq. (19) above, i.e.
Pcorr =
(
cos2
θA − θB
2
)2
+
(
sin2
θA − θB
2
)2
=
3 + cos(2θA − 2θB)
4
(27)
and obtains an error with probability (sin2(θA − θB))/2
The average error probability for all possible scenarios,
i.e. either no basis transformation, a single basis transfor-
mation by one party or the combination of two different
basis transformations, is computed as the weighted sum
6ΘA
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FIG. 4: The average error probability 〈Pe〉 if both parties
randomly apply basis transformations described only by the
angles θA and θB .
over the error probabilities of these scenarios. Since Al-
ice and Bob apply their basis transformations at random,
each error probability is weighted with 1/4. This yields
an average error probability for all scenarios (cf. Figure
4 for a plot of this function)
〈Pe〉 = 1
8
sin2 θA +
1
8
sin2 θB
+
1
16
sin2
(
θA + θB
)
+
1
16
sin2
(
θA − θB
)
.
(28)
When the results are correlated, Eve obtains either
|ϕ1〉TU or |ϕ4〉TU , as it can be computed from eq. (26).
Based on this fact, the collision probability and further on
Alice’s and Bob’s Shannon entropy can be computed fol-
lowing the same argumentation as described in the other
scenarios. The Shannon entropy of all for scenarios is
again computed as the weighted sum of the single Shan-
non entropies (cf. eq. (23)). Due to the interference term
resulting from the application of two different basis trans-
formations, the Shannon entropy is higher compared to
a single basis transformation (cf. Figure 5 for a plot of
this function):
H =
1
4
h
(
cos2
θA
2
)
+
1
4
h
(
cos2
θB
2
)
+
1
8
h
(
cos2
θA + θB
2
)
+
1
8
h
(
cos2
θA − θB
2
)
.
(29)
This is due to the fact that it is more difficult for Eve
to react on two separate basis transformations with dif-
ferent angles θA and θB. Further, we see that eq. (29)
reduces to eq. (23) if either θA = 0 or θB = 0. Hence,
taking the optimal choice for only one basis transforma-
tion, i.e. the Hadamard operation, we see that if both
parties apply the Hadamard operation at the same time,
the operations cancel out each other. Therefore, a re-
quirement to reach a better result is that the angles θA
and θB have to be different. As we can further see from
Figure 5, the Shannon entropy for a combined applica-
tion of basis transformations is higher than 0.5 for some
ΘA
ΘB
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FIG. 5: Alice’s and Bob’s Shannon entropy H if both parties
randomly apply basis transformations described only by the
angles θA and θB.
regions. In detail, the maximum of the function plotted
in Figure 5 is
H ∼ 0.55 and thus IAE ∼ 0.45 (30)
for θA ∈ {pi/4, 3pi/4} and θB = pi/2 or vice versa. Hence,
if just one of the parties applies a Hadamard operation
and the other one a transformation about an angle of pi/4
or 3pi/4, Eve’s mutual information is about 10% lower
compared to the application of a single basis transforma-
tion (cf. eq. (24)). At the same time, we see from Figure
4 that for these two values of θA and θB the error prob-
ability is still maximal with 〈Pe〉 = 0.25. This means,
Alice and Bob are able to further increase the security by
the combined application of two basis transformations.
APPLICATION OF GENERAL BASIS
TRANSFORMATIONS
In the following paragraphs, we want to extend the re-
sults from the previous section by applying general basis
transformations, which means Alice and Bob are able to
choose both angles θ and φ in eq. (8) freely. Following
the scenarios from the previous section, we are at first
looking only on one party performing a basis transfor-
mation on their respective qubits and afterwards on two
different basis transformations performed by each of the
parties. For each scenario we will show, which values for
θ and φ are optimal to give an adversary the least infor-
mation about the raw key bits. In the course of the two
scenarios, we will denote Alice’s operation as Tx
(
θA, φA
)
and accordingly Bob’s operation as Tx
(
θB, φB
)
.
Application of a Single Transformation
As already pointed out above, the application of the
basis transformation occurs at random and Eve is able
to obtain full information about Alice’s and Bob’s secret
7due to the structure of the state |δ〉, if the two parties
do not apply any basis transformation at all. Therefore,
we look at first at the effects of a basis transformation at
Alice’s side. Her initial application of the general basis
transformation Tx
(
θA, φA
)
does alter the state |δ〉1QR4TU
introduced by Eve such that it is changed to
|δ′〉1QR4TU = T (1)x
(
θA, φA
)|δ〉1QR4TU (31)
After a little algebra, we see that Alice obtains all four
Bell states with equal probability and after her measure-
ment the state of the remaining qubits is
eiφA cos
θA
2
cosφA |Φ+〉Q4|ϕ1〉TU
−ieiφA cos θA
2
sinφA |Φ−〉Q4|ϕ2〉TU
−ieiφA sin θA
2
|Ψ+〉Q4|ϕ3〉TU
(32)
assuming Alice obtained |Φ+〉1R. We are presenting just
the state for this particular result in detail because it
would be simply too complex to present the representa-
tion of the whole state for all possible outcomes here.
Nevertheless, for the other three possible results the re-
maining qubits end up in a similar state, where only
Bob’s Bell states of the qubits Q and 4 as well as Eve’s
auxiliary states of the qubits T and U change accordingly
to Alice’s measurement result.
Before Bob performs his Bell state measurement, he
first has to reverse Alice’s basis transformation. This
can be achieved by applying T−1x
(
θA, φA
)
on qubit Q in
his possession. Whereas this would reverse the effect of
Alice’s basis transformation if no adversary is present,
the structure of Eve’s state |δ〉 makes this reversion im-
possible, as already pointed out in the previous section.
Therefore, the state in eq. (32) changes into
eiφA cos2
θA
2
[
cosφA
1√
2
(
|00〉Q4 + e−2iφA |11〉Q4
)
|ϕ1〉TU − i sinφA 1√
2
(
|00〉Q4 − e−2iφA |11〉Q4
)
|ϕ2〉TU
+e−iφA tan2
θA
2
1√
2
(
|00〉Q4 + |11〉Q4
)
|ϕ3〉TU
]
+i cos
θA
2
sin
θA
2
[
cosφA
1√
2
(
|00〉Q4 + |11〉Q4
)
|ϕ1〉TU + i sinφA 1√
2
(
|00〉Q4 − |11〉Q4
)
|ϕ2〉TU
−eiφA 1√
2
(
|01〉Q4 + e−2iφA |10〉Q4
)
|ϕ3〉TU
]
(33)
for Alice’s result |Φ+〉1R and accordingly for the other re-
sults. Therefore, Bob obtains the correlated state |Φ+〉Q4
only with probability
PΦ+ =
1
4
(
3 + cos
(
4φA
))
cos4
θA
2
+ sin4
θA
2
(34)
and the other results with probability
PΦ− = 2 cos
4 θA
2
cos2 φA sin
2 φA
PΨ+ =
1
2
sin2 θA cos
2 φA
PΨ− =
1
2
sin2 θA sin
2 φA.
(35)
Hence, due to Eve’s intervention Bob obtains a result
uncorrelated to Alice’s outcome with probability
Pe = PΦ− + PΨ+ + PΨ−
=
1
2
(
sin2 θA + cos
4 θA
2
sin2
(
2φA
))
.
(36)
Assuming that Bob obtains |Φ+〉Q4, i.e. the expected
result based on Alice’s measurement outcome, Eve ob-
tains either |ϕ1〉, |ϕ2〉 or |ϕ3〉 from her measurement on
qubits T and U in the state described in eq. (33) with
the respective probabilities
Pϕ1 =
cos4 θA2 cos
4 φA
1
4 (3 + cos 4φA) cos
4 θA
2 + sin
4 θA
2
Pϕ2 =
cos4 θA2 sin
4 φA
1
4 (3 + cos 4φA) cos
4 θA
2 + sin
4 θA
2
Pϕ3 =
− sin2 θA2
(3 + cos 4φA) cos4
θA
2 + 4 sin
4 θA
2
(37)
Furthermore, in case Bob measures an uncorrelated re-
sult, Eve obtains two out of the four auxiliary states
|ϕi〉 at random. Hence, due to the basis transformation
Tx
(
θA, φA
)
, Eve’s auxiliary systems are less correlated to
Bob’s result compared to the application of a simple ba-
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FIG. 6: The average error probability 〈Pe〉 depending on the
angles θA and φA
sis transformation as described in eq. (18) and eq. (26)
above. In other words, Eve’s information on Alice’s and
Bob’s result is further reduced compared to the previous
scenarios.
Since Alice applies the basis transformation at random,
i.e. with probability 1/2, the average error probability
〈Pe〉 can be directly computed using eq. (36) and its
variations based on Alice’s measurement result as
〈Pe〉 = 1
4
[
sin2 θA + cos
4 θA
2
sin2
(
2φA
)]
. (38)
Keeping in mind that Eve does not introduce any er-
ror when Alice does not use the basis transformation
Tx
(
θA, φA
)
, the average collision probability 〈Pc〉 can be
computed as (cf. also eq. (37))
〈Pc〉 = 1
64
(
53− 4 cos θA + 7 cos
(
2θA
)
+ 8 cos4
θA
2
cos
(
4φA
))
.
(39)
In further consequence this leads to the Shannon entropy
H of the raw key, i.e.
H =
1
2
[
h
(
cos2
θA
2
)
+ cos2
θA
2
h
(
cos2 φA
)]
. (40)
As we can directly see from Figure 6, the average
error probability 〈Pe〉 has its maximum at 1/3 with
θA ≃ 0.39183pi and φA = pi/4 or φA = 3pi/4. For this
choice of θA and φA we see from Figure 7 that the Shan-
non entropy is also maximal with H ≃ 0.79248. Hence,
the adversary Eve is left with a mutual information of
IAE = 1−H = 0.20752 (41)
This value for the mutual information is less than half of
Eve’s information on the raw key compared to the appli-
cation of a simplified basis transformation (cf. eq. (24)
and eq. (30) above). Hence, the application of a gen-
eral basis transformation by either Alice or Bob decreases
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FIG. 7: Alice’s and Bob’s Shannon entropy H of the raw key
depending on the angles θA and φA
Eve’s information on the raw key and simultaneously in-
creases the probability to detect the eavesdropping at-
tempt compared to the application of one or two simple
basis transformations.
Unfortunately, the angle for θA ≃ 0.39183pi to reach
the maximum value is rather odd and difficult to real-
ize in a practical implementation. In contrast, an angle
θA = 3pi/8 is more convenient and much easier to realize.
For this scenario we can compute from eq. (38) an aver-
age error rate of 〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.33288 and from eq. (40) the
respective Shannon entropy H ≃ 0.79148 (cf. also Figure
6 and Figure 7), which are both just insignificantly lower
than their maximum values. Accordingly, Eve’s mutual
information on the raw key is slightly above 20%, i.e.
IAE ≃ 0.20852. Hence, the security of the protocol is
drastically increased using a general basis transformation
compared to the application of a Hadamard operation.
Application of Combined Transformations
In the previous paragraphs, we discussed the applica-
tion of one general basis transformation Tx
(
θA, φA
)
on
Alice’s side. It is easy to see that the results for the av-
erage error probability 〈Pe〉 in eq. (38) as well as the
Shannon entropy H in eq. (40) are the same if only Bob
randomly applies the basis transformation Tx
(
θB, φB
)
on
his side.
Hence, the more interesting scenario is the combined
random application of two different basis transformations
Tx
(
θA, φA
)
on Alice’s side and Tx
(
θB, φB
)
on Bob’s side.
The application of these two different basis transforma-
tions alters the initial state accordingly to
|δ′〉1QR4TU = T (1)x
(
θA, φA
)
T (4)x
(
θB, φB
) |δ〉1QR4TU
(42)
where again the superscripts ”(1)” and ”(4)” indicate
that Tx
(
θA, φA
)
is applied on qubit 1 and Tx
(
θB, φB
)
on
qubit 4, respectively. Following the protocol, Alice has to
undo Bob’s transformation using T−1x
(
θB, φB
)
before she
can perform her Bell state measurement. Similar to the
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FIG. 8: Eve’s expected error probability 〈Pe〉 depending on
the angles θA and θB . The remaining parameters φA and φB
are fixed at pi/4.
application of one basis transformation described above,
Alice obtains all four Bell states with equal probability
from her measurement. The state of the remaining qubits
changes in a way analogous to eq. (32) above and Bob
has to reverse Alice’s transformation using T−1x
(
θA, φA
)
.
This changes the state similar to eq. (33) above. Hence,
when Bob performs his measurement on qubits Q and
4, he does not only obtain a result correlated to Alice’s
outcome, but all four possible Bell states with different
probabilities such that an error is introduced in the proto-
col. As already discussed in the previous section, the re-
sults from Eve’s measurement on qubits T and U are not
fully correlated to Alice’s and Bob’s results and therefore
Eve’s information on the raw key bits is further reduced
compared to the application of only one transformation.
Due to the fact that Alice as well as Bob choose at
random whether they apply their respective basis trans-
formation, the average error probability is calculated over
all scenarios, i.e. no transformation is applied, either Al-
ice or Bob applies Tx
(
θA, φA
)
and Tx
(
θB, φB
)
, respec-
tively, or both transformations are applied. Therefore,
using the results from eq. (38) above, the overall error
probability can be computed as
〈Pe〉 = 1
8
[
sin2 θA + cos
4 θA
2
sin2
(
2φA
)]
+
1
8
[
sin2 θB + cos
4 θB
2
sin2
(
2φB
)]
+
1
16
[
sin2
(
θA + θB
)
+cos4
θA + θB
2
sin2
(
2
(
φA + φB
))]
+
1
16
[
sin2
(
θA − θB
)
+cos4
θA − θB
2
sin2
(
2
(
φA − φB
))]
(43)
having its maximum at 〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.41071. One possibility
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FIG. 9: Alice’s and Bob’s Shannon entropy H of the raw key
depending on the angles θA and θB . The remaining parame-
ters φA and φB are fixed at pi/4.
to reach the maximum is to choose the angles
θA = 0 θB ≃ 0.45437pi
φA =
pi
4
φB =
pi
4
.
(44)
In fact, as long as φA = pi/4 or φA = 3pi/4 the value of
φB can be chosen freely to reach the maximum. Hence,
the average error probability is plotted in Figure 8 taking
φA = φB = pi/4.
Following the same argumentation and using eq. (40)
from above, the Shannon entropy can be calculated as
H =
1
4
[
h
(
cos2
θA
2
)
+ cos2
θA
2
h
(
cos2 φA
)]
+
1
4
[
h
(
cos2
θB
2
)
+ cos2
θB
2
h
(
cos2 φB
)]
+
1
8
[
h
(
cos2
θA + θB
2
)
+cos2
θA + θB
2
h
(
cos2
(
φA + φB
))]
+
1
8
[
h
(
cos2
θA − θB
2
)
+cos2
θA − θB
2
h
(
cos2
(
φA − φB
))]
(45)
having its maximum at H ≃ 0.9452. This maximum is
reached, for example, using
θA ≃ −0.18865pi θB ≃ 0.42765pi
φA ≃ −0.22405pi φB ≃ 0.36218pi.
(46)
The maximal Shannon entropy can also be reached using
other values but they are not as nicely distributed as in
the case of the average error probability.
Since the maximal Shannon entropy is reached with
a different set of values for θ{A,B} and φ{A,B} than the
maximal error probability, it is necessary to find a set of
parameters for the basis transformation, which results in
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a high error probability as well as a high Shannon en-
tropy at the same time. On the one hand, inserting the
values to reach the maximal Shannon entropy in eq. (43)
we obtain an average error probability 〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.3993.
On the other hand, using the parameters for a maximal
error probability in eq. (45) we get H ≃ 0.90635. There-
fore, Alice and Bob have to decide, whether they want
to maximize 〈Pe〉 or H , being aware that the respective
other value is not optimal any more.
Looking again at set of values for θ{A,B} and φ{A,B},
which are more suitable for a physical implementation
than the values mentioned above, one possibility for Alice
and Bob is to choose
θA = −3pi
16
θB =
7pi
16
φA = −pi
4
φB =
3pi
8
(47)
leading to an almost optimal Shannon entropy H ≃
0.9399 and a average respective error probability 〈Pe〉 ≃
0.39288. Keeping φA and φB fixed – as already discussed
in the previous section – such that
θA =
3pi
16
θB =
7pi
16
φA =
pi
4
φB =
pi
4
(48)
the same average error probability 〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.39288 and a
slightly smaller Shannon entropy H ≃ 0.91223 compared
to the previous values are achieved. Hence, we see that
using a set of parameters more suitable for a physical
implementation still results in a high error rate and leaves
Eve’s mutual information IAE below 10%.
RESULTS AND IMPLICATIONS
The results presented in the previous sections have di-
rect implications on the security of QKD protocols based
on entanglement swapping. Where in some QKD proto-
cols [13, 15, 16] a random application of a Hadamard op-
eration is used to detect an eavesdropper and secure the
protocol, the above results indicate that the Hadamard
operation is not the optimal choice. Using the Hadamard
operation leaves an adversary with a mutual information
IAE = 0.5 and an expected error probability 〈Pe〉 = 0.25
(cf. Table I), which is comparable to standard pre-
pare and measure protocols [1–3]. An application of
the Hadamard operation by both communication par-
ties does not increase these values since the interference
terms in eq. (28) and eq. (29) cancel out each other (cf.
also Figure 4).
A slight change in one of the basis transformations,
e.g. from θB = pi/2 (in case of the Hadamard opera-
tion) to θB = pi/4 is enough to decrease the adversary’s
information by about 10% to IAE ≃ 0.45 while leav-
ing the expected error probability at the same value of
φA = 0 φA =
pi
2 φA =
pi
4
φB = 0
θA = 0, θB = 0
〈Pe〉 = 0
IAE = 1
θA =
pi
2 , θB = 0
〈Pe〉 = 0.25
IAE = 0.5
θA =
3pi
8 , θB = 0
〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.333
IAE ≃ 0.208
φB =
pi
2
θA =
pi
2 , θB =
pi
4
〈Pe〉 = 0.25
IAE ≃ 0.45
θA = 0, θB =
pi
2
〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.334
IAE = 0.125
φA =
pi
4
θA =
3pi
16 , θB =
7pi
16
〈Pe〉 = 0.393
IAE = 0.088
TABLE I: Overview of the expected error rate 〈Pe〉 and Eve’s
information IAE on the raw key bits for different values of the
angles θA,B and φA,B.
〈Pe〉 = 0.25 (cf. eq. (29) and Table I). This gives Alice
and Bob a slight advantage compared to other entan-
glement swapping based protocols like [13, 15, 16]. In
particular, looking at the protocol by Song [15], where
a basis transformation about an angle θA = 2pi/3 is ap-
plied, Eve’s information is reduced by almost 25% from
IAE ≃ 0.594 (coming directly from eq. (23) above) in the
original protocol to IAE ≃ 0.45 (cf. also [23] for details).
Giving Alice an additional degree of freedom, i.e.
choosing both θA and φA freely, she is able to further
decrease the adversary’s information about the raw key
bits. By shifting φA from pi/2 to pi/4 and θA from pi/2
or pi/4 to 3pi/8 the adversary’s information is reduced to
IAE ≃ 0.208 (cf. eq. (40)). This is a reduction by almost
60% compared to QKD schemes described in [1–3, 13, 16]
and more than 50% compared to the combined appli-
cation of two different basis transformations (cf. also
[22, 23]). At the same time, the expected error proba-
bility is increased by one third to 〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.333 (cf. eq.
(38)). Hence, an adversary does not only obtain fewer
information about the raw key bits but also introduces
more errors and therefore is easier detectable.
Following these arguments, the best strategy for Alice
and Bob is to apply different basis transformations at
random to reduce the adversary’s information to a min-
imum. As already pointed out above, this minimum of
IAE ≃ 0.0548 is reached with a rather odd configura-
tion for θ{A,B} and φ{A,B} as described in the previous
section. Hence, it is important to look at configurations
more suitable for physical implementations, i.e. configu-
rations of θ{A,B} and φ{A,B} described by simpler frac-
tions of pi as given in eq. (47) and (48). In this case,
we showed that φ{A,B} can be fixed at φA = φB = pi/4
and with θA = 3pi/16 and θB = 7pi/16 almost maxi-
mal values can be achieved resulting in IAE ≃ 0.088 and
〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.393 (cf. eq. (48) and also Table I).
Regarding physical implementations, another – even
simpler – configuration can be found, involving only pi/2
and pi/4 rotations (cf. Table I). In this case θA = 0,
φA = pi/4 and θB = φB = pi/2 which leaves the expected
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error probability at 〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.334. The adversary’s infor-
mation is nowhere near the minimum but still rather low
at IAE = 0.125.
In terms of security these results represent a huge
advantage over QKD protocols based on entanglement
swapping [13, 15, 16] or standard prepare and measure
protocols [1–3]. Such protocols usually have an expected
error probability of 〈Pe〉 = 0.25 and a mutual informa-
tion IAE = 0.5. Due to the four degrees of freedom,
the error rate is between one third (〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.334) and
more than one half (〈Pe〉 = 0.411) higher in the scenar-
ios described here than in the standard protocols, which
makes it easier to detect an adversary. Taking the prac-
tical threshold value of about 11% for the error rate [11]
into account, it is easy to see that an adversary has to at-
tack fewer qubits in transit to stay below this threshold
compared to standard prepare and measure protocols.
Further, the adversary’s information is reduced by 75%
(to IAE = 0.125) in a conservative setting, and up to al-
most 90% (to IAE = 0.055) in the optimal setting. This
makes it possible to allow a higher threshold value than
11% for entanglement swapping based QKD protocols.
CONCLUSION
In this article, we discussed the effects of basis trans-
formations on the security of quantum key distribution
protocols based on entanglement swapping. We showed
that the Hadamard operation, a transformation from the
Z- into the X-basis often used in prepare and measure
protocols, is not optimal in connection with entangle-
ment swapping based protocols. Starting from a general
basis transformation described by two angles θ and φ, we
inspected the effects on the security when the adversary
follows a collective attack strategy. We showed that the
application of a basis transformation by one of the com-
munication parties decreases the adversary’s information
to about IAE ≃ 0.2075, which is less than half of the in-
formation compared to an application of the Hadamard
operation. At the same time, the average error probabil-
ity introduced by the presence of the adversary increases
to 〈Pe〉 = 1/3. A combined application of two differ-
ent basis transformations further reduces the adversary’s
information to about IAE ≃ 0.0548 at an average error
probability of slightly more than 0.41.
Since the configuration of the angles θ and φ to reach
these maximal values is not very suitable for a physical
implementation, we also showed that these maximal val-
ues are almost reached with more convenient values for
θ and φ. In this case, the adversary’s information is still
IAE < 0.1 with an average error rate 〈Pe〉 ≃ 0.393 for a
combined application of two basis transformations.
These results have a direct impact on the security
of such protocols. Due to the reduced information of
an adversary and the high error probability introduced
during the attack strategy, Alice and Bob are able to
accept higher error thresholds compared to standard
entanglement-based QKD protocols.
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